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3Introduction
 From a structural point of view, September 2008 can be appropriate to make 
an assessment of the first 10 years of the single currency (launched in January 
1999). We also need to address the progress in the Lisbon Agenda, in 
structural reforms, in tax and social harmonisation. 
 But, in the short term, the main issues are the financial crisis and the economic 
recession. 
 The recession shows the inability of the current governance in Europe to 
support growth and to react to shocks.
A recurrent question is: How to improve European governance? 
4Introduction
 More fundamentally, the crisis shows the limits of the capitalist growth 
model. 
 The limited amount of oil and raw material resources like the rise of 
environmental constraints requires a global management of natural 
resources.
 The financial crisis shows the limits of a system based on the domination 
of financial markets and speculation. The massive public intervention in 
the US and the UK shows that a deregulated financial system is not 
viable.
 The crisis can be an opportunity to challenge the dominance of liberal 
ideology and to highlight the need for greater social intervention in 
economic fields.
 The key task in the current period is to show that the system cannot be 
corrected by minor reforms (such as a more sophisticated regulation of 
financial markets). We need a major change in economic functioning; this 
change must be credible; this change requires a new sociological and 
political alliance.
5The 2007-2008 crisis
 The rise in energy and other raw material prices. 
 The fall in the dollar.
 The housing crisis.
 The financial crisis. 
The crisis has four components:
6The rise in energy and raw material prices
 Prices started to rise in 2005. From 2004 to 2008.2, oil prices rose by 217% 
for the Brent in $, 152% for the Brent in €, 122% for raw materials in $, 77% 
for raw materials in €. 
 This increase is mainly explained by structural factors. Strong demand was 
driven by growth in emerging countries while supply remained stable. The 
tension is particularly strong for oil, where production is expected to remain 
stable before falling.
 Recently, these factors were exacerbated by the financial crisis. Substantial 
capital flows were invested in the oil or raw material derivative markets, 
contributing to increased prices. 
 Since two months, prices have been decreasing, under weak global growth 
prospects and for some products, an increase in supply. However, prices 
are likely to remain high and to rise again in the medium term.
 But, in the short term, the inflation rate should dramatically fall in 2009.
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8This rise in prices has 4 consequences:
 It generates a shock on the price level, which looks like an inflation revival. 
This shock increases the diversity among EU countries. It makes euro 
membership more difficult for several NMS. As the ECB refuses to
distinguish price levels and inflationary shocks, ECB maintains a relatively 
high target interest rate. 
 The shock is a tax on the purchasing power of MS. Who will pay: workers or 
companies? 
Wage growths remain weak in all old MS in 2008. There is no evidence that 
workers will obtain a full wage indexation on prices. In most countries, real 
wages will decrease in 2008, even if productivity grows. In the Euro zone, 
real wages decreased by 0.5% in 2008-Q1 after a 0.5% increase in 2007-
Q1. In most countries, social benefits were not fully indexed on prices. The 
fall in households’ purchasing power will induce a fall in consumption.
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IPCH Inflation rate (y-o-y)
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This rise has 4 consequences:
 Consuming countries must accept the rise of energy prices; they could 
implement measures to offset the effect on the poorest. 
 The rise in oil prices generates an increase in the world saving rate. In 
consuming countries, it reduces income, therefore consumption. At the 
global level, it induces a demand gap, which should be filled by lower 
interest rates. Richer countries should accept a rise in their external deficit 
and in their public or private (households or firms) debt. If the shock weighs 
on households, an increase in the public debt or household debt is 
necessary. If the shock weighs on firms, then firms must accept to be more 
indebted or must issue shares that will be purchased by the new rich 
countries (sovereign funds). But, the financial crisis might prevent this 
increase in debt.
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The fall of the dollar
 Since 2006, the fall of the dollar has contributed to depress European 
output, while its high level in 2000-2002 had contributed to the high growth 
level in the EU during these years. 
 The euro has risen not only vis-à-vis the dollar but also against many Asian 
currencies pegged to the dollar.
 From 2004 to 2008, the Chinese Yuan increased by 17.5% against the 
dollar, but remained stable in euros. 
 Asian countries follow a policy of low exchange rates to stimulate their 
growth. In the US, active monetary policies lead to sharp cuts in interest 
rates during recession periods. Due to the inertia of the ECB, the exchange 
rate of the euro is too strong given the required growth of most countries in 
the area;  it tends to increase during periods of recession.
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Euro-dollar exchange rate
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The Housing bubble
 During the last 12 years, many European countries (particularly Spain, the 
UK, and Ireland) had experimented a strong growth of the housing
investment, due to favourable credit condition. This expansion was 
accompanied and facilitated by a burst on housing real prices. Real estate 
has strongly supported the growth in the Anglo-Saxon countries and in 
Spain. 
 In 2007, the housing market turned. Prices began to fall. The financial crisis 
has raised awareness of the risks of credit. The reversal is particularly 
violent in Spain, Ireland and the United Kingdom as it is in the US.
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The financial crisis
 From 1980 to 2007, the world economy was dominated by the growth of 
financial capitalism. 
 Masses of capital increasingly large have been invested in financial 
markets. The strong profitability they required was obtained by increasing 
the share of profits in value added but mostly by stock market bubble. 
 The race for profit has fed permanent financial innovations. Hedge funds 
have used the leverage, i.e. the difference between the rate of profit and 
interest rates, to obtain extravagant returns. 
 The increase in the stock exchange values and the housing prices had 
strongly supported household consumption in the Anglo-Saxon countries. 
 Financial deregulation and marketization have become the norm at the 
expense of continental model based on the banks expertise.
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The financial crisis
 The subprime crisis of 2007 has destroyed this edifice.
 Much of mortgages made in the United States had benefited to fragile 
households: they could not support rising interest rates and falling housing 
prices.
 The losses induced by the subprimes weakened the whole financial sector 
by a domino effect. It appeared that the rating agencies were unable to 
properly assess the risk of these credits. The decline in the value of 
securitized loans weakened the banks balance sheets; put in bankruptcy 
the most fragile;  induced a dramatic fall of the value of financial institutions 
stocks and destroyed confidence in the interbank market. 
 The central banks had to intervene to ensure market liquidity and then to 
organize the rescue (or the failure) of the more fragile banks. Real estate 
and stock prices have dramatically fallen. 
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The financial crisis
 The impact of the crisis was affected by the pricing to market, the pricing to 
model and the IFRS norms, which requires to immediately record losses on 
financial assets (fair value principle). In high uncertainty situations, financial 
assets are depreciated in the markets, this requires putting a strong 
aversion to risk in the models and tends to depreciate more sharply all 
assets. Banks are forced to use these values in their sheets, even if they 
consider that assets are worth more than that (because the market is 
exaggerating losses). 
 The IMF estimates the cost of the crisis to 945 billion dollars, 225 from 
losses on credit depreciation and 720 from assets depreciation. Half would 
be borne by banks and the rest by investment funds. These losses are 
distributed worldwide since European banks, investment funds or pension 
funds have invested heavily in the United States, by buying securitized 
credits, or by becoming shareholders of US financial institutions, as Crédit
Agricole which has made heavy losses on Calyon and Natixis on CIFG. 
Does the diversification compensate the risk of asymmetric information that 
we incur when we invest far from our bases?
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The effect on growth
 The wealth effect (financial and real estate) tends to reduce households 
consumption.
 The housing investment is falling.
 Firms reduce investment due to uncertainty, balance sheet effects, loss of 
competitiveness and credit restriction. 
 Banks restrict credit due to balance sheets deterioration (their balances as 
the firm and the households’ balances) and to risk aversion.
 Banks increase interest rate on credit to recover their balance sheets and to 
compensate the risk.
 It will take time for companies and banks to recover a satisfactory financial 
situation. 
 Low interest rates may reduce this period, but it runs the risk of inducing a 
new bubble. 
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Discrepancies between US and the Euro zone
 The US financial sector is more affected. But, the Fed reacts to the crisis by 
lowering the rate from 5.25% to 2%, low interest rates helping to improve 
the balance sheet of banks. Instead, the ECB is trying to separate monetary 
policy for the policy to assist banks in difficulty. The crisis has not prevented 
the ECB to increase its rate of 4 to 4.25%.
-0.9-0.5-5.6-2.2Public balance
323.42.55Inflation rate
(forecast)
1.32.51.52.45GDP 
(forecast)
4.24.73.75.2Interest rate 
(10 years)
4.25425.25Interest rate 
(3 months)
August 2008July 2007August 2008July 2007
Euro zoneUS
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The Financial crisis
 The issue of the crisis can be discussed at two levels. In the short term, the 
governments must stop the fall of property prices and of stock market and 
must avoid financial institutions bankruptcy. To reduce moral hazard, they 
must avoid rewarding the vice: the managers must be dismissed and 
shareholders and investors must be ruined.
 As in the Paulson plan, the State must buy at low prices the depreciated 
assets of the banks and must recapitalize banks if necessary.
 For the long term, two strategies are possible. The first is to impulse the 
revival of financial markets, with just a little more regulation. The second is 
to go back to a financial system focused on its primary objectives, to finance 
productive activities, to offer depositors low but guaranteed returns; banks 
must forget speculative activities. The German view rather than the Anglo-
Saxon view…
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The Financial crisis
 All relationships of banks and firms with tax or regulation heavens must be 
forbidden.
 The financial sector must be deflated, for example by providing public 
retirement pensions, by  promoting direct investment.  
 Financial innovations whose security is not guaranteed or the risk is not 
calculable must be forbidden. Financing of speculation by banks must be 
forbidden. The remuneration of operators should be controlled. Hedge funds 
must be restricted by preventing them from using leverage effects.   
 Central Banks must use instruments such as reserve requirements or 
capital ratios on credit, which should vary depending on market conditions 
and on type of credit. It must deter property loans during the housing bubble 
and stock market speculation in times of financial bubbles. 
 The choice between the two strategies is a political issue. The financial 
crisis may be an opportunity for the anti-liberals to engage points on the 
ideological level, to show that the financial capitalism is dangerous and to 
build a coalition for change.
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2008-2009: Two years of recession
 The old EU15 countries are expected to have virtually no growth in the 
second quarter 2008, the slowdown will be particularly marked in Spain, 
Ireland and the UK most affected by the housing crisis.
 Confidence, according to the surveys of the European Commission, is still 
on a declining trend from 115 in August 2007  to 88 in July 2008. 
 Unemployment rate should stop to decrease (Germany); It should increase 
weakly (France, Italy, IK) or more dramatically (Spain).   
 The growth should remain satisfactory in the NMS who has a specific 
dynamism. However, Estonia and Latvia suffer from a banking and housing 
crisis.
24
The 2007-2008 crisis
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The 2007-2008 crisis
 The downturn in the Euro zone was first induced by the 
households’ consumption and investment; since 2008-Q2, the 
exportation slowed; then, the productive investment. 
Euro Zone : Growth in 2006-2009
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What economic policy answers?
 The ECB increases its interest rates from 4 % to 4.25% on 9th July 2008, 
when the Fed goes down from 6.75 in July 2007 to 2.75 now. The ECB 
considered that the risk of inflation was more important than the risk of 
recession. Its main objective was to dissuade employees to claim wage 
indexation and to guaranty that the petroleum and raw material prices rise 
be paid by the workers and not by the firms. 
 The financial crisis increases the interbank interest rate. There is a risk of 
credit crunch. Inflation rate should decrease in 2009.
 The rise in prices in the euro zone reached 4% in July 2008 so that we can 
not accuse the ECB of rigor, to make too much effort not to exceed the 2% 
target. But the rise of energy price requests other actions than rising interest 
rates. We need an interest rate cut to offset the rise of the world savings 
rate; we must accept the direct effect on the consumption prices indexes; 
we must accept an increase in the public deficits and a decrease in profit 
businesses; we need a fiscal policy to concentrate purchasing power losses 
on the richest and to save the poorest. The organization of economic policy 
in the area zone does not allow such a policy.
The monetary policy
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 In 2007, the fiscal situation of most Euro MS seems very favourable.  
France was the only country to have a fiscal structural primary deficit.
 Despite the recession, the European authorities have not changed
strategies; “countries in surplus or in equilibrium should not do more than let 
the automatic stabilizers; the others should pursue to reduce their structural 
deficit”. 
 In France, the Sarkozy government decided in late 2007 a tax package that 
represents 12 billion € (0.6 percentage point of GDP) for 2008. France is 
therefore right to the limit of 3%. Germany has decided on tax cuts that 
mainly benefit the companies (0.4 percentage point of GDP). Spain is the 
only country to announce an expansionary package (1 percentage point of 
GDP): support for housing, abolition of the wealth tax, tax cut of 400 € by 
household.
What economic policy answers?
Fiscal policy 
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What economic policy answers?
 In total, in 2008,  the fiscal stimulus should only be 0.3% of GDP in the euro 
area; much less than in the United States and Great Britain.
 As in 2002, the economic governance of the Euro zone does not allow a 
strong and coordinated reaction against the recession. 
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What economic policy answers?
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What economic policy answers?
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 Almunia (September 2008) refuses any change in the monetary and fiscal policies 
framework. He claims structural reforms: “Measures to enhance the flexibility of 
product, labour and services markets would increase potential growth and would 
boost consumer and investor confidence. We need a full implementation of the 
Service directives; we need to remove barriers to entry in energy market; we need to 
implement reforms of the labour markets”. 
 In September, at the Nice summit, the EU economy and Finance ministers and the 
Central Bank governors “decided to mobilise common and national policies to 
respond to situations that may vary from one country to another”.
But, the decisions were very poor: 
 “In budgetary matters, the Member States could let the automatic stabilisers work to 
support activity, while continuing their efforts to control spending and respect the 3% 
deficit limit; 
 The structural reforms should be continued as they contribute to restoring purchasing 
power by increasing competition; 
 The European Investment Bank (EIB) will support SME funding, thanks to the 
increase in its financial means (by 15 billion euros in 2008-2009 or more than 50% 
over two years, and 30 billion by 2011)”.
What economic policy answers?
A common strategy ?
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 In fact, no common fiscal strategy was decided. The structural reforms 
concern mainly the market labour liberalization or good markets 
deregulation. The ministers did not learn from the financial crisis that it is the 
capital market which is the main problem, that liberalisation and reregulation 
are the problem, not the solution.
 The actual economic policy framework does not allow a strong reaction in 
the short term, neither in monetary policy, neither in fiscal policy. 
 Europe also needs a reflexion on its structural strategy. But the Commission 
refuses to engage it. 
What economic policy answers?
A common strategy ?
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10 years of EMU
 Before the launch of the euro, the proponents of EMU thought that the 
single currency would induce rapid economic convergence within Member 
States.
 But there have been persistent and sometimes rising divergences in the 
monetary union in terms of output growth, inflation, unemployment and 
external balances since 1999.
 The introduction of the single currency made winners (Ireland, Spain, 
Greece) and losers (Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal).
 The functioning of the euro area, by requesting similar macroeconomic 
policies for countries in different situations, has increased growth 
disparities in the Member States.
 European institutions and rules set by the Treaties (ECB, Stability and 
Growth Pact) were unable to tackle these divergences. 
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10 years of EMU
 The Euro was a success from a monetary point of view, but not from an 
economic one. 
 In most economies, especially the bigger ones, the introduction of the euro 
did not result in the promised acceleration of growth, but in the persistence 
of a poor trend. 
 At the end of 2007, eight euro area countries remained in a mass
unemployment situation. 
 The growth of labour productivity remains low in most Euro MS, especially in 
Spain, Italy, France and Belgium. The Euro did not deliver the promised 
increase of productivity due to liberalisation and accrued concurrence. 
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10 years of EMU
 Euro area countries have been unable to define a common growth strategy, 
hesitating between: 
¾ A social-Keynesian strategy, with a strong commitment to maintaining an 
active economic policy, the European Social Model (ESM) and an 
industrial policy; 
¾ A liberal strategy based on market deregulation and reform of the ESM 
through public expenditures cuts and a smaller role of the State in the 
economy.
 This debate takes place in the context of globalisation, which makes it 
necessary for Continental European countries to adapt. 
¾ Should they move towards a liberal or a Scandinavian model?
¾ Should this choice be made at a European or national level?
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 Euro area GDP growth was rather satisfactory between 1985 and 1991 (3.1% 
per year). 
Annual GDP growth decelerated by 1.3 percentage points between 1992 and 
1998 due to a bad management of the German reunification and to restrictive 
fiscal policies implemented in the convergence process to meet the Maastricht 
criteria. 
The launch of the euro in 1999 did not enable the area to grow at a more 
satisfactory rate. 
 Since 1997, GDP growth has been clearly weaker in the euro area (2.25% per 
year) than in the UK (2.9%) or the US (3.0%). 
Non euro area EU members have performed better than euro area members. 
 If we look on per capita GDP level, it appears that, in 10 years, all NMS have 
succeeded an important catch-up. The Scandinavian countries and the liberal 
ones (Ireland and the UK) had relatively strong growth. It was also the case for 
Spain and Greece. The performances of the 3 bigger economies and of 
Portugal were poor. 
10 years of EMU
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GDP (average annual growth)
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Unemployment disparities
 From 1998 to 2007: slight decrease in unemployment rates in most euro area countries 
(except in Portugal). 
 Rapid decrease in unemployment rates in four countries: 
¾ Ireland and Finland, thanks to robust GDP growth; 
¾ Italy thanks to low labour productivity growth; 
¾ Spain thanks both to growth and low labour productivity. 
However in 2007, eight euro area countries remained in a mass unemployment situation. 
 In terms of employment rates:
¾ Italy stands clearly below partner countries; then comes Belgium; 
¾ Other MS can be split into two groups: 
¾ ‘Medium rate’ countries: Germany, Greece, Spain, France, the Netherlands;
¾ ‘High rate’ countries: Ireland, Austria, Portugal, Finland, and outside the area: 
Sweden, Denmark and the UK; 
¾ Scandinavian and liberal countries perform well (and also Austria). Medium rate 
countries need to raise their employment rate almost by 10% to reach the UK level 
(18% for Italy). European countries need more jobs and not more workers.
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Unemployment and employment rates
Source: OECD.
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Unemployment disparities 
 Of the 27 EU countries, 9 have an unemployment rate above 7%, 9 have an 
unemployment rate of between 7 and 5% and 9 rate below 5%.
 Crucial policy issue: should demand be raised first, to induce higher labour demand 
hoping that labour supply will follow? 
Structural reforms (abolition of early retirement, better control of unemployment 
allowances) would be introduced only ex post and in countries where labour demand is 
clearly above labour supply – This strategy would involve inflationary risks.
Or should countries where unemployment is high, start with structural reforms which 
would raise labour supply and employment? Such a strategy would raise a risk of 
raising unemployment and increasing poverty among the unemployed. 
 A majority of countries with high unemployment rates chose to give incentives to 
companies to reduce labour productivity growth and to hire unskilled workers (Spain, 
Italy, Belgium France); other countries (Germany) tried instead to increase employment 
through competitiveness gains, especially through competitiveness gains, especially 
through higher productivity in the  industry. 
 The European Employment Strategy and the Lisbon Agenda did not succeed in 
imposing a common strategy.
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Inflation differentials
 A good functioning of the monetary union requires avoiding the emergence of 
disparities in price levels. 
Different price levels will generate competitiveness differentials and will need to 
be corrected later through output growth differentials.
 Inflation differentials have remained substantial in the euro area.
 Countries with higher inflation rates were countries with:
¾ Higher GDP growth (Spain, Ireland, Greece) 
¾ Or low initial price levels, due to the Balassa-Samuelson effect (Spain, 
Greece, and Portugal). 
 However Italy and the Netherlands also had relatively high inflation rates. The 
Dutch economy ran at more than full capacity for several years and inflationary 
shocks were generated by increases in indirect taxation. 
 Higher than the average inflation rates were in none of these countries due to 
excessive demand induced by excessive public deficits. 
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Real interest rates differentials
 Another issue in a monetary union: catching-up countries, like Spain, have 
higher GDP growth and inflation rates than other countries. It is therefore 
difficult to run a single monetary policy even in the absence of asymmetric 
shocks. 
 With a single nominal interest rate, euro area countries have had different real 
interest rates corrected from growth. The single monetary policy was restrictive 
for Germany and expansionary for Ireland, Greece and Spain where
companies and households had a strong incentive to borrow and invest, which 
boosted domestic GDP growth and inflation. 
 In the 1999-2005 period, the average euro area interest rate was 3.1%, while a 
Taylor rule – based on a 2% inflation target and output gaps as estimated by 
the OECD – would have suggested rates of 1.75% for Germany, 3.05% for 
France, 3.8% for Italy, 4.0% for the area, and 8.05% for Spain. 
 However the 2% inflation target may be judged too low. The euro area needs 
higher GDP growth and this may result in transitory inflationary pressures on 
some markets. The OECD potential output estimates are very low: the euro 
area output gap was estimated to be nil in 1999, when the unemployment rate 
was 9.2% and nil also in 2002, when the unemployment rate was 8.3%. 
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Inflation and real interest rates
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 The ECB has been less concerned with GDP growth than the Fed, in good and 
in bad times. Consequently fiscal policies should have been more reactive in the 
euro area. 
 Financial developments and globalisation make more and more difficult the 
conduct of Monetary policy. Low interest rate induces financial or real estate 
bubbles. High interest rate induces crisis. 
 Since 1999, the monetary stance was: 
¾ Clearly more accommodative than suggested by a Taylor rule in the US;
¾ More accommodative in the euro area too, but to a lesser extent;
¾ More restrictive in the UK.
Real interest rates differentials
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Interest rates: Taylor rule and actual Central 
banks’ objective rate
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Wage competition
 In the 1999-2006 period, wage share in GDP decreased at the euro zone level 
and in eight member states. 
 From 2000 to 2006, real wages per worker did not increased in Italy, increased 
by only 0.5% per year in Austria, 0.6% in Germany and in Belgium, while it 
increased by 1.3% in France and in the Netherlands and 2.8% in the UK. 
 Increasing company profitability and price competitiveness through downwards 
pressure on wages became a major strategy in several countries, like in 
Germany and Austria
 This strategy boosted exports but put a drag on private consumption in these 
countries, thus dampening demand in the whole euro area. 
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Adjusted wage share in GDP, 1998/2007
Source: European Commission.
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Wage competition: A non-cooperative game
¾ Winners: Germany and Austria which succeeded to support domestic GDP 
growth by a positive contribution of net exports (by around 0.5 percentage 
point of GDP each year). 
¾ Losers: Spain and France (both 0.7 percentage point per year). 
 Considering patterns of domestic and foreign demand, euro area countries can 
be divided into 4 groups: 
¾ ‘Winners’: Ireland, Spain, Greece - with both strong domestic and foreign 
demand; 
¾ ‘Bad guys’: Germany, Austria, Netherlands - offsetting weak domestic 
demand by strong gains in export demand;
¾ ‘Losers’: Italy, Portugal - suffering from both low domestic and external 
demand; 
¾ ‘Victims’: France, Belgium, Finland - where a weak external demand partly 
offsets a satisfactory domestic demand.  
50
GDP and Domestic Demand growth rates, 1999-2005
Source: European Commission.
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Competitiveness and current account balances
 The euro area as a whole won competitiveness from 1996 to 2001 thanks to the 
fall in the euro vis-à-vis the US dollar. A weak euro together with the NTIC 
bubble accompanied strong GDP growth (3% per year from 1997 to 2000) and 
employment growth (8.7% in five years)
¾ This shows that the area keeps a substantial potential growth and can grow 
rapidly if there is a robust demand
 The competitiveness gains were more than cancelled by the appreciation of the 
euro against the US dollar and Asian currencies between 2001 and 2004. The 
euro area needs a weaker exchange rate in the light of the high level of 
unemployment
 From 1988 to 1999, some countries succeeded in depreciating their currency 
against the Deutsche Mark in real terms: Finland, Italy, Spain and, outside the 
future euro area: Sweden. 
 Germany, Austria and Portugal joined the euro area at too high exchange rates 
which induced substantial current account deficits.
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Competitiveness and current account balances
 Since 1999, Austria and Germany have succeeded in restoring their competitiveness.
 While Italy seems unable to maintain competitiveness without time-to-time devaluation, Italy 
and Portugal have been more hit than the average area by the emergence of China. 
¾ Fixed exchange rates and rigid inflation rates can induce persistent exchange rates 
misalignment periods. Countries can no more devalue their currency and wage 
moderation policies are the only tool left to restore competitiveness but take a long time 
to play and are painful, since they depress demand both at home and in the area. 
¾ These non-coordinated policies have widened current account imbalances: in 2005, 
Germany and Netherlands run huge external surpluses while Spain, Greece and 
Portugal run large deficits. 
 National saving rates are very low in Greece, Spain and Portugal which is unusual for 
countries growing at a rapid rate 
 Output growth is high in Greece, Spain, the UK, and the US, with very low national and 
households saving rates. On the contrary, Belgium, Germany, Austria and France suffer for 
too high saving rates. Low saving rates seem necessary to have high growth and low public 
debt. Virtue is dangerous in Europe, since a weak domestic demand induced by a high 
savings ratio cannot be offset by low interest rates or large public deficits. 
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External positions
* 1988 = 100; on the basis of unit labour costs in the manufacturing sector. A rise means competitiveness gains.
Source: OECD.
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Too passive fiscal policies
 European Countries have adopted two kinds of fiscal strategies: 
¾ Some (Belgium, Spain, Ireland, the Netherlands) made the effort 
needed to bring their budgetary positions in balance, or even with a 
structural surplus (Finland), either to comply with European rules, or 
because of robust growth, or to prepare for future rises in old-age 
related spending. 
¾ Other countries have instead maintained a structural deficit, either 
because they could more easily resist European pressure due to their 
size (Germany, France, and Italy) or because they used creative 
accounting to minimise their deficits (Portugal, Greece). 
 The SGP strategy: bringing structural government balances to 0 before 
allowing automatic stabilisers to play – without any discretionary policy 
allowed -, was not implemented in the larger economies, although they did
not form a coalition to change the fiscal strategy either. 
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Too passive fiscal policies
 In the last recession (2000-2004), fiscal policies were hardly used to support 
GDP growth in the euro area:
¾ Fiscal impulse was 1.2 percentage point of GDP only, as compared to 
5.6 in the UK and 6 in the US. 
¾ Except for Greece and Finland, euro area countries implemented close to 
neutral fiscal policies. 
 The SGP was a corset for fiscal policies in these low growth years.
 The objective of bringing debts to below 60% of GDP was not fulfilled: 
government debts still stand at around 100% of GDP while the French and 
German debts have risen at above 60% of GDP. 
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Fiscal Policy
* The Fiscal impulse is the change in the primary cyclically adjusted government balance. A positive figure 
reflects an expansionary policy. Source: OECD.
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Too passive fiscal policies
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 However public finances are more sustainable in the euro area than in the 
US, UK, Japan.
 Public finances have deteriorated in the euro area because of a persistent 
negative output gap.
Public finances sustainability in 2006
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What EMU@10 report said?
 In May 2008, the Commission published a rapport on 10 years of EMU. The 
report mix important scientific works, advertising sentences and a contestable 
political and economical strategy. 
 EMU brings macroeconomic stability but not growth.
 EMU avoids exchange rate realignment but not misalignment (in the zone or with 
the dollar).
 Budgetary discipline has increased but we do not have a good coordination 
between monetary and fiscal policies. SCP induced persistent conflicts between 
the Commission and the MS.
 Financial market integration increased but also financial instability (in 2001/02 as 
in 2007/08).
 The Commission promotes market liberalization but forgets fiscal and social 
harmonisation.
 Euro becomes the second international currency but euro level affects European 
industries competitiveness.
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What EMU@10 report said?
 EMU has a strategy about globalisation: innovation and specialisation in high 
value-added sectors but is it enough for the losers of globalisation?
 Structural reforms remain national as do problems. It remains hard to have an 
European Agenda. Is it compatible with the democratic process? 
 Divergences between countries remain. Big countries have specific problems. 
The only strategy for the Commission is flexibility. Is it enough?
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What EMU@10 report proposes?
 The SGP, the SGP, the SGP, with more surveillance….
 The Commission evokes “the benefit of future generation”. But why the 
Commission refuses the “golden rule” as a medium objective? 
 A good idea: to address macroeconomic imbalances (but why the Commission 
seems unable to forget the SGP?)
 More coordination in structural reforms. But this means only more flexibility. It is 
enough? Are MS condemns to the liberal models with inequalities and 
instabilities? What about “social Europe”? “Social cohesion”? Ecological 
strategies? 
 Can we have more market integrations without fiscal and social harmonisation? 
 Do European societies need more wage flexibility and wage differentiation? 
When the wage share has decreased and wage inequalities increased?
 It there any alternative? The Scandinavian model rather the liberal one? 
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What EMU@10 report proposes?
 Can we prone more financial integration without a strategy about financial 
instability? 
 The Commission wants that Europe speak by only one voice in international 
economic affairs. But do MS agree? What will be the international strategy of 
EU? A liberal one (more flexibility) or a social-democrat (more international 
governance)? 
 The problem of the compatibility between democracy and European organization 
remains. 
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Structural issues: the Lisbon Strategy   
 In fact, the European Commission does not recommend a pure liberal solution, 
but a mixed strategy based on a sound macroeconomic policy, on increasing 
markets flexibility, a reform of social protection to decrease its weigh and to 
raise employment incentives but also a public support for innovation.
 The Lisbon strategy was a technocratic project, without mobilization of the 
European opinion, involvement of the civil society and of the social partners. 
The strategy is defined by a technocratic structure, without democratic debate, 
taking account of the differences between the countries, of the trade-off 
necessary between various objective, of the differences of opinion and interest 
of the social forces. 
 In December 2007, the Commission settles a New Community Lisbon 
Programme (CLP), which is less ambitious.
 Macroeconomic issues are forgotten. Programmes do not deal with the 
question of financial system reform, with tax or social harmonisation. 
 Will this programme have any impact on national decisions?
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10 keys objectives  
 A new Social Agenda focussing on education, migration and demographic 
evolutions. Not on poverty and social cohesion. To remove the barriers in the 
single labour market. 
 A common policy on immigration. A blue-card to attract skilled-workers. What 
for the others?
 A Small Business Act.
 A reduction by 25% of administrative burdens.
 To strengthen the single market and to increase competition in services. 
Nothing about social harmonisation and workers rights? 
 A “fifth freedom”, the free movement of knowledge
 To improve the framework for innovation, to improve its financing,
 To complete the internal market for energy (is it the good strategy?) and to 
adopt the climate change package. 
 An industrial policy geared towards more sustainable production and 
consumption.
 New opportunities for international trade.
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Institutional disparities
 Euro zone countries differ also in terms of institutional factors. 
 Most countries, except Spain and Ireland, have high levels of public 
expenditure (> 50% of GDP). 
 At the euro area level, the share of primary structural public spending was the 
same in 1990 and 2005. 
 The share has risen in several countries: Portugal (by 11 percentage points), 
Belgium (4) and France (2.5) and outside the euro area, the UK (5 percentage 
points). The share has fallen in other countries: the Netherlands (6 percentage 
points), Spain (4), Ireland (2.5), and also in Sweden (6 points). 
 The European Commission has failed to impulse public expenditures cuts in 
the European Union and countries have hardly converged. High levels of public 
expenditure require high levels of taxation. 
 But, as the Scandinavian example shows, high tax to GDP ratios are consistent 
with high employment rates (see chart 1). 
65
Public expenditure
Source: OECD.
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Employment rates and taxation rates
Source: OECD.
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Tax harmonisation 
 Taxation is high in EU countries. Tax to GDP ratios stand at around 40% as 
compared with 25% in Japan and the US. This high level of taxation allows the 
funding of the European social model characterised with a high level of public 
expenditure and transfers. It is hence crucial for European countries to keep 
their capacities to collect tax revenues, according to democratically agreed rules. 
 The European social model is threatened by globalisation that puts tax and 
social domestic systems into competition. Taxing the more mobile factors (big 
companies, financial capital, highly skilled workers and wealthy people) is more 
and more difficult, which undermines domestic redistribution policies. As 
unanimity is required, tax harmonisation progresses very slowly in Europe, which 
obliges MS to reduce the rate on firms and to reduce taxes on the wealthiest 
households.
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Tax harmonisation 
 The European treaties stress four ‘fundamental freedoms’: free movement of 
persons, services, goods and capital. However, the texts do not say anything on 
the need for countries to remain responsible for domestic taxation. Besides, the 
logic of European integration is such that the Commission wishes decisions to 
be taken at its level; it is thus not in favour and may even be against measures 
guaranteeing domestic taxation autonomy. Member states should therefore pay 
attention to keep their fiscal autonomy, although they rarely do.
 Only the taxation of interest income has been harmonized. All countries will 
eventually declare interest paid to community residents to their countries of 
origin, some countries may in a transitional period levy a tax.
 The taxation of resident households is not harmonized. Also, the rich tend to flee 
the countries which capital or inheritance, which oblige countries to gradually 
abandon theses taxes. 
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Tax harmonisation 
 France loses a lot of time and energy to gain the right to extent the reduced VAT 
rate on restaurants, which is not useful from an economic point of view. 
 France and UK propose a “green VAT” which is difficult to implement.
 Europe needs to introduce a important and coordinated ecological taxation. But 
the progress is rather slow, as countries have different interests. The taxation 
may be useful to reduce taxes on labour. In 2008, the ecological taxes remains 
small and non coordinated. 
 The growing number of European companies make necessary to reach a 
harmonisation of business taxation. EU did not succeed to reach an agreement 
and many countries have embarked on tax competition by lowering the rate of 
corporation tax. Some countries wants a minimum rate is established, but the 
United Kingdom, Ireland and New members refused.
 The Commission suggests a harmonisation of tax bases, but without 
harmonisation of the tax rates, which is not acceptable.
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Tax harmonisation 
 Regarding enterprises, the principle of taxation at source should be 
reaffirmed, so that each company pays property taxes for the profits it has 
made in a given country. What is needed is the introduction of minimum rates, 
depending on the level of development reached by the country, for instance 
20% for New Member States and 30% for the old Member States. The lower 
minimum rate will increase as countries converge. 
 To preserve its social model, Europe should fight more vigorously against the 
possibilities of tax evasion induced by globalization. An important issue on a 
global scale is the need to fight against tax havens and offshore centres, 
which launder dirty money and promotes speculation and tax evasion. The 
major industrial countries should prohibit their firms and their financial 
institutions to make financial transactions, to have activities, to have 
subsidiaries in these countries. Neither France nor Europe has so far taken 
this fight seriously.
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Four models?
 European countries can be classified in four models (Esping-Anderson, 1990):
¾Scandinavian model: very high level of social expenditure based on 
citizenship, funded through taxation, high female employment rate, low social 
inequalities and a strong cooperation between social partners (Finland, 
Netherlands and also Denmark and Sweden).
¾ Continental model: high level of social expenditure, based mostly on 
activity, financed by social contributions, a high level of labour protection 
(Germany, France, Belgium, Austria).
¾ Mediterranean model: intermediate level of social expenditure based on 
activity, financed by social contributions, low level of family and unemployment 
benefits offset by family solidarity, low female participation rates, and high level 
of labour protection (Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal). 
¾ Liberal model: low level of social expenditure, based on citizenship, 
targeting the poorer, and with a low level of labour protection (Ireland and also 
the UK).
 Replacement ratios derived from unemployment benefits are high in most euro 
area countries, at the exception of Mediterranean ones (Spain, Greece, Italy), 
where unemployment rates are not particularly low. Employment protection is 
high in continental and Mediterranean countries, as compared to liberal and 
some Scandinavian countries. 
 These discrepancies make difficult the convergence of social policies in EU. 
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Source: OECD.
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Indicators of social performance
 Life satisfaction is the highest in Scandinavian countries (and in the 
Netherlands); it is the lowest in Mediterranean countries. 
 Income inequality: Scandinavian countries show the more equal income 
distribution. Mediterranean and liberal countries the more unequal. 
 Poverty rates are significantly higher in liberal and Mediterranean models; 
this reflects the unequal income distribution.
 Life expectancy is lower in the Anglo-American countries than in 
Scandinavia (except in Denmark), Continental Europe and the 
Mediterranean countries. 
 Infant mortality - an indicator of the efficiency of the health system – is 
substantially higher in liberal countries. Denmark seems to have a specific 
problem. 
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Indicators of social performance
 Hours worked: It appears that high GDP per capita in liberal countries is 
largely due to a high number of hours worked. Labour productivity per hour 
is relatively high in continental countries. 
 Prisoners: The share of prisoners is very high in the United States, and 
also relatively high in the United Kingdom. It is small in Scandinavian 
countries. 
 Trust in people is more common in Scandinavian countries (and in the 
Netherlands) than in other countries. This shows that the Scandinavian 
model is based on social practices that are deeply rooted in peoples’ minds 
and that it may be difficult to extend it to other countries where such 
practices are not a tradition (Algan and Cahuc, 2006)
 Globally, the social performance in the United States and in the liberal 
European countries is worse than in Scandinavian and Continental
European countries.
 During the last years, poverty rate seems to increase in Nordic countries 
and to slightly decrease in France and Germany. But there are a lot of 
statistical issues. 
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Social indicators
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Social indicators
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How to adapt the ESM? 
National reforms or a European pilot? 
 Convergence or respect of national specificities?
 Three reasons for convergence:
¾ To help the Market Integration. Social system discrepancies become 
difficult to deal with when economic integration increases.    
¾ To prevent the race to the bottom and the social dumping. However this 
risk has not materialised yet and the threat remains theoretical
¾ To increases the European citizenship. The Commission tries to 
intervene in this domain to make visible the importance of European 
Institutions. 
 But convergence is impossible of national models are too different, too 
depending of history and social institutions. European citizens are not ready 
for a European solidarity.
 National system cannot be reformed from EC without the intervention of 
social partners. 
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Five points of view of the future of EMS
 The “market-oriented view” expects that globalization and EMU will oblige 
continental countries to move towards the Anglo-Saxon model.
 The sovereignists (like the Scandinavian, UK and most NMS) want to keep all 
their autonomy in social protection system. For how long will domestic 
disparities remain consistent with the Internal Market, with the free movement 
of goods, capital and services? But not every national specificity must be 
respected. 
 Very few people suggest a big bang leading to a unified system in Europe. 
This would raise insoluble issues: solidarity remains today at the national level 
and there is no EU solidarity. The only system that could be easily extended 
would be a liberal system. However, a move towards a single system, under 
the effects of increased labour mobility in Europe, the development of 
European companies, increased competition and possibly ECJ’s decisions 
cannot be totally excluded. 
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Five points of view
 The proponents of a Social Europe are in favour of a progressive
convergence towards a unified social model in Europe, embedding a high 
level of social protection. The evolution towards a social and economic EU 
government would allow for the harmonisation of taxation and social 
protection to the top. Social minima (minimum incomes, replacement rates 
for unemployment and pensions benefits) and wage minima would be
settled according to the level of domestic economic development and would 
increase in catching-up countries. Social Europe would allow for the 
coordination of wage increases and hence would have positive demand 
effects while minimising the unfavourable effects in terms of 
competitiveness. 
 But Anglo-Saxon countries and NMS refuse to be seen imposing a model 
which appears today in crisis in the large countries continental, unable to 
avoid the high unemployment and the development of exclusion and which 
the financial prospects are not assured. The unification of strongly disparate 
systems appears problematic, as well on the technical level as on the 
political and social level. It supposes homogeneity of Europe much stronger 
than it is it really.
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Five points of view
 In the current strategy, European authorities try to impulse progressive but 
converging reforms aiming at modernising national social protection systems. 
 But modernisation is a dangerous objective. It means to increase the gain from 
work by decreasing the social benefit of unemployed, retired people, women or 
people with incapacities.
 Such a convergence would be obtained through soft methods, like the BEPGs
or the Lisbon Agenda and like the open method of coordination, each country 
however keeps its autonomy in social areas. This process is necessarily slow 
and not visible for economic agents and populations. It remains disconnected 
from national debates and reforms. The BEPGs and the OMC are dialogue 
processes between European and national administrations and do not really 
involve national social players, as they are hardly debated at the country level 
and in the general public. 
 How should the process be democratised and strengthened? Currently the 
process is not mobilising and does not lead to the emergence of a Social 
Europe project. Moreover, its content raises questions. In practice the role of 
European authorities stands between supporting a specific ESM and 
questioning it under the name of modernisation.  But theses issues should be 
decided after a social debate by a democratic political process.
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Enhancing Social Europe (February 7, 2007)
 A declaration for « Enhancing Social Europe » was released in February 
2007 by 9 of the 27 Labour Ministers (Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, France 
Greece, Hungary Italy, Luxembourg, Spain,). It is a minority text in 
Europe. In particular, no Scandinavian country signed. The declaration 
suggests “to strengthen the ESM… by elaborating a vision for the future of
Social Europe…by promoting with a balanced approach…to adaptations 
related to globalisation, while ensuring social rights and protection 
enshrined in the European tradition”. The four suggested directions are: 
employment policies and flexicurity (fighting against precarious work; 
developing minimal social standards); social cohesion (preserving the 
social goals and the universal and solidarity character of social protection 
systems; defining minimum incomes); equal opportunities (supporting rise 
in the female employment rate; strengthening family policies and network 
of nurseries); a better European social governance (evaluating the social 
impact of all Union policies; developing the European social dialogue).
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Social Europe and the French presidency
 Social Europe is not at the centre of the French presidency objectives, even 
if its theme is “a more protective Europe”.
 There is a report by Bernard Brunhes: “Un agenda social pour une Europe 
compétitive et solidaire”. Some interesting ideas:
¾ To work at the Commission level to solve the contradiction between the 
concurrence freedom and the rights of the workers (after the Laval, 
Viking and Rüffert decisions of the ECJ).
¾ To protect the public and social services (Services of General Interest) 
from the Concurrence legislation 
¾ To adopt European objectives in terms of poverty rate and minimum 
wages.
¾ A great declaration by the European Council; a European Social model 
exist and we all want to maintain this model, even if this model needs to 
evolve. 
 ETUC ask the French Presidency to act for a strong Social Agenda (2010-
2015). 
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 The strategy of the re-nationalisation would consist in giving again national 
governments room for manoeuvre to implement specific economic strategies. 
The organization of economic policy in Europe would be re-examined while 
seeking with better preserving the autonomy of the Members States.  Those 
would be authorized to implement national industrial policies, to protect their tax 
revenues with measures fighting tax avoidance, to choose freely their social 
model, etc.
 However, euro zone MS would continue to share a common monetary policy, 
interest rate and exchange rate. It would always be necessary to define some 
code of good conduct which should lead to penalize excessive inflation rates or 
external deficits. The countries would thus not have the possibility of choosing 
their policy mix.  It also appears difficult to re-nationalise the external trade 
policy. 
 Any hope of taxation or social harmonization would disappear. Each country 
would have to define its specific strategy vis-à-vis globalisation. The risk would 
be great that this re-nationalisation reinforces the temptation of not-cooperative 
strategies, of social and tax dumping. 
 The countries would have no choice but move towards the liberal model. 
Which policy answers?
Less Europe? The re-nationalisation of economic policies
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 Economic policy could not be decided at the area level. Europe is not a nation: 
there is no unification of the political and social lives. Taxation and social 
protection systems are not unified. Economic situations remain different. No 
consensus on economic policies, institutions, reforms, strategy exists among the 
area; divergence can only be decided by a democratic election. But European 
peoples would probably not agree with economic, political and social unification 
decided at the European level. It is difficult to imagine a single organization able 
to manage different national situations. 
 Europe governance will need national policies coordination. The euro area 
seems more appropriate for such co-operation than the EU-27 because it 
includes more homogenous economies. But this supposes that countries agree 
to share a common “European economic and social model”, that will need to be 
defined, protected, and be able to evolve.   
Which policy answers?
More Europe? 
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 However, the policy to be followed and the governance remain a delicate 
issue. Economic policy should combine Keynes, Colbert and social 
democracy.
 In a mass-unemployment situation, the euro zone needs a growth-oriented 
policy mix. It would be desirable to set up real economic policy coordination 
in the framework of the Eurogroup, with whom the ECB would have to 
dialogue. This co-ordination should not focus on public finance balances, 
but should aim at supporting economic activity and achieving a 3% annual 
growth target, as in the Lisbon strategy. The process will have to take into 
account countries disparities. The task is not so easy. 
Which policy answers?
More Europe? 
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 Europe must try to design a specific model of European firms, caring about 
employment, growth in the area where they are located and by durable 
growth. Companies have a social role to play. They must take account of 
the interests of their employees and customers, not only of that their 
shareholders. This supposes that Member States maintain relatively high 
company taxation, and subsidize firms locating their activities in lagging 
areas and to help the economic sectors in difficulty, as to provide them 
incentives to innovation and research. States should have an active 
industrial policy, aiming both at developing Large European Companies and 
at supporting the development of innovating SME and Research Centres 
networks. European authorities should plan the future of productive 
activities and industrial employment in Europe; reduce the weight of 
competition policy and promote a European industrial policy within the 
framework of the Lisbon strategy. 
Which policy answers?
More Europe? 
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 The objective would be to maintain the European social model, 
characterized by a significant level of transfers, public expenditure and thus 
of taxation. The system will have to be preserved from tax and social 
competition by harmonisation in Europe that will have to include the 
prohibition of unfair competition but also the introduction of minima rates for 
taxation (corporate taxation, tax on wealth and on higher incomes) and for 
benefit (minimum income, minimum pension replacement ratio) and by 
strong measures against tax havens at a worldwide scale. 
 The European Social Model will have to rely on its comparative advantages 
(free education and health for all, public infrastructures, social security 
benefits) to remain competitive in spite of globalisation. With a more 
dynamic growth, the decrease of unemployment rate would allow to extent 
in Continental countries a “flex-security system” inspired by the 
Scandinavian model, which should included a more precise follow-up of the 
unemployed.
Which policy answers?
More Europe? 
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 A new economic policy in Europe will require difficult economic and social 
choices: 
 A robust growth is needed in the short-term in order to reduce unemployment, 
but in the long run it would increase environmental imbalances. It will be 
necessary to re-orientate production and consumption, but this will have a cost in 
term of purchasing power which people will have to accept. 
 Does Europe have to open the door widely to immigration to compensate for its 
demography or is it necessary to ensure first full employment and the rise in 
workers skills? 
 Is it necessary to do everything to encourage employment of older workers, 
people with incapacity, and mothers with young children? Yes, of course, 
because a job develops capacities and integration in the society. 
 But this policy implies lower incomes for the people of targeted categories who 
do not succeed in taking a job. Also, is any kind of job positive for the individual? 
Should not we use part of productivity gains to lower working time and decrease 
the importance of market jobs? Is any market activity socially useful? 
Which policy answers?
More Europe? 
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 Improving the European economic framework is not a technical issue; it 
requires a major change in the economic policy thinking, a new alliance 
between social classes concerned about full employment and social 
cohesion, the willingness to depart from the financial markets and 
globalised firms point of view. This move would be easier to undertake at 
the European than at a National level, but it would require an agreement 
between people of each EMU Member State, which would be difficult to 
reach. 
Which policy answers?
More Europe? 
